Abstract The original 13 Food and Drug Administration industry-sponsored recombinant human bone morphogenetic protein-2 (rhBMP-2) trials investigating its use in spinal fusion all reported no associated adverse events. However, subsequent series of studies began reporting complication rates that were much higher than those that were initially published. Critical analysis of the original rhBMP-2 industryassociated data found systematic alignment favoring positive outcomes with no proven clinical advantage over bone graft. The sources of potential bias leading to inaccurate reporting of original rhBMP-2 efficacy and safety profile include flawed study design, methodological technique, data reporting and analysis, and significant financial conflict of interest. As such, to ensure the integrity of the scientific literature, further measures should be taken by researchers, surgeons, authors, journal editors and reviewers to assess for potential sources of bias.
Introduction
The original discovery of bone morphogenetic protein (BMP) in 1965 by Urist [1] was followed by extensive preclinical and translational research in the application of these growth factors in spine fusion surgery. There was a need in selected patients to investigate alternatives and adjuncts to autologous iliac crest bone graft (ICBG) that would prove to be effective and safe. ICBG is considered the gold standard in spinal fusion with inherent osteoinductive, osteoconductive, and neovascularization properties, fusion rates varying from 40 % to 100 % [2] .
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) initially approved rhBMP-2 (Infuse; Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Memphis, TN) in the use of anterior lumbar interbody fusions (ALIF) with the LT-CAGE (Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Memphis, TN) in patients with degenerative disc disease at 1 level from L4-S1. The authors of the original industry-sponsored or industry-associated studies of rhBMP-2 all reported the efficacy in applications including both anterior and posterior cervical and lumbar fusion surgery [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] . Additionally, the authors of these studies stated similar safety profiles with no adverse effects or complications attributable to rhBMP-2 in any study. Favorable research findings regarding the use of rhBMP-2 in spinal fusion surgery has undoubtedly contributed to its increased utilization from 0. 7 With the complexity of mechanisms and interactions of growth factors, the nature and time course of adverse events would prove to be difficult to predict. However, clear concerns in the clinical application of rhBMP-2 were cited including bony overgrowth, interaction with nearby neural structures, local and systemic toxicity, osteoclastic activation, and potential for cancer risk [16] .A divergence from the previously reported safety profile surfaced as the literature reported a greater frequency of complications associated with the use of rhBMP-2 in spinal fusion.
This disparity in the findings resulted in scrutiny by the scientific community, press, and government regarding the safety of BMP and the overarching peer review and editorial process. In a systematic review, Carragee et al concluded that the original industry-sponsored publications were systematically aligned in favor of BMP use for spinal fusion surgery, in turn contributing to the widespread off-label use and associated the complications [17••] .
The reporting and publication of the inaccurate safety profile and results of original industry-sponsored rhBMP-2 trials occurred as a result of clear bias. Bias has been defined as any process at any stage of inference that tends to produce results or conclusions that differ systematically from the truth [18] . Substantial methodological, operational, reporting, editorial, and financial bias leads one to question the efficacy of rhBMP-2in both on-label and off-label uses. The critique of the original rhBMP-2 trials varied from the scientific community to the government including Consumer Reports, The Wall Street Journal, the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, US Senate, the New York Times, and the Department of Justice all chiming in on this controversial topic [19••] . Following this investigation, Medtronic commissioned the Yale University Open Data Access (YODA) project to report the safety and efficacy of rhBMP-2. Using data from the original 13 trials and 31 cohort studies, these authors concluded that rhBMP-2 has no proven clinical advantage over bone graft and may be associated with significant sequelae, thereby making it difficult to identify clear indications for rhBMP-2 [20••]. In light of the subsequent conflicting assessments of rhBMP-2 with regards to efficacy and safety, it is crucial to clarify the systematic flaws of the original trials in order to improve understanding and reporting of bias in the scientific literature.
Lessons from systematic failures of the infuse trials
Systematic review of the original rhBMP-2 by Carragee et al [17••] fostered awareness of the current shortcomings in the peer review process, specifically as is it pertains to reporting of novel biological technologies for clinical application. The authors' analysis of the complete data presented by the 13 industry-sponsored studies shed light upon several areas of bias, whether intentional or unintentional, from the level of the author to publication editors. The importance of maintaining a high degree of scientific integrity relies on professionalism from the investigators and peer review for clinicians and the public to understand the published literature [21•]. Appraisal in limitations of the formative publications provides understanding of potential sources of bias in the peer review process and guidance of direction in how to face these challenges.
The FDA's premarket approval (PMA) investigations were open label investigations in which researchers, surgeons, and patients knew treatment allocation of the involved subjects. Nonblinded assessment is a significant source for potential conscious or unconscious bias. A recent meta-analysis of 16 trials with subjective outcomes demonstrated that nonblinded assessors exaggerated the effectiveness of treatment with a pooled effect size of 68 % (95 % CI, 14 %-230 %). The authors concluded that the significant evidence of observer bias in randomized clinical trials with subjective scale outcomes and failure to blind the assessors of outcomes resulted in a high risk of substantial bias [22] . In a review of randomized clinical trials published from [2002] [2003] [2004] While surgical studies may be more difficult to blind compared with nonsurgical trials, efforts must be made in order to minimize potential bias.
All of the original BMP studies employed noninferiority trial designs rather than superiority trial designs. This model is intended to show that a new treatment is "not acceptably worse" than the current standard treatment. Debate regarding the use of such trials began in the mid-1900s as some authors have argued that the complexity of the study design and difficulty in verification as reasons against the utilization of noninferiority models [24] . Furthermore, noninferiority trials often carry "substantial methodological flaws" and subsequent risk for type II errors [25] . A review including 162 randomized controlled trials of noninferiority and equivalence hypotheses reported that only 20 % of articles fulfilled reporting requirements specific to this study type, in addition to 12 % of trials with misleading conclusions [26] . It has been suggested that BMP use would be better proven through superiority trials [21•].
Carragee et al [17••] included analysis of control group techniques in the assessment of the industry-sponsored BMP trials. The authors reported several discrepancies from the established literature of ICBG and local bone autograft use in spine fusion. The posterolateral fusion trials comparing rhBMP-2 with ICBG did not incorporate facet preparation, thus, fusion at facet joints was not radiographically assessed. The quantity of ICBG used was also disproportionately lower with as little as 7 cc. In addition, local bone autograft harvested from the decompression was discarded rather than being applied to augment the ICBG volumes. The control group of the posterior lumbar interbody fusion (PLIF) trial may have had unnecessary ICBG harvest, as local bone autograft alone has been shown to be sufficient for fusion, thereby contributing to preventable handicap. In addition, Carragee et al noted that the reporting of ICBG harvest-site morbidity was higher (50 %-95 %) than previous estimates. The methodological techniques used in the original BMP studies place the control ICBG groups at higher risk for poorer quality fusion, nonunion, and potential failure when compared with the standard surgical method for lumbar spinal fusion [17••] .
Each of the 13 original BMP trials under-reported complications and adverse events related to BMP use when compared with additional data available through the FDA and unsponsored trials. As a result, a near-perfect safety profile of BMP was established. However, Carragee et al reported that the complication rates associated with BMP were 5 %-15 % in anterior procedures and included implant displacement, subsidence, infection, urogenital events, and retrograde ejaculation. The authors also cited complication rates associated with posterior fusion procedures ranging from 25 %-50 % including radiculitis, ectopic bone formation, osteolysis, and poorer global outcomes [17••]. Of serious concern, Carragee et al demonstrated a greater apparent risk of a new malignancy with groups treated with the 40 mg dose of rhBMP-2 per level. However, even more alarming was the lack of reporting on this issue in the original publication even though it was significantly discussed in the FDA Executive Summary [14] . Carragee et al attributed "fundamental error in the statistical analysis of uncommon and serious adverse events within each of the original studies" behind the low rates of complications. In addition, the authors cited the need for sensitivity in the detection of adverse events in noninferiority trials [17
As all of the original BMP trials were industry-sponsored, the authors had significant financial conflict of interests. Since the authors involved in these trials received payments during and after the study periods, a strong conflict of interest was present. Carragee et al estimated the magnitude of the financial gain, with a median payment of $12 million for 12 of the 13 studies with no information available for 1 study
Conflict of interest statements reported in these trials were marred with vague and inconsistent statements. In combination with an absence of standardized methodology and ascertainment protocol, including successful fusion outcome, the authors were prone to bias in favor of BMP use [21•].
Recommendations of bias classification in scientific publication
Critical assessment of the original industry-sponsored rhBMP-2 trials has provided insight into the potential sources of bias that must be carefully be addressed to maintain a high degree of scientific validity. The systematic bias leading toward reporting and publication of favorable outcomes for BMP use in respected orthopedic journals brings into question the current state of the editorial review process. In addition to the use of current guidelines to ensure quality reporting, including Consolidated Standards of Reporting Trials (CONSORT) [27, 28] , checklist to evaluate a report of a nonpharmacologic trial (CLEAR NPT) [29] ; Preferred reporting items for systematic reviews and metaanalyses (PRISMA) [30] ; Strengthening the Reporting of Observational studies in Epidemiology (STROBE) [31] ; Meta-analysis Of Observational Studies in Epidemiology (MOOSE) [32] , a scientific classification system of bias is necessary to further appraise the quality of the published literature.
The Levels of Evidence rating system [33] was introduced in 2003 to categorize literature based upon the study quality and design. This 5-level rating system, with Level I evidence being randomized control trials with least bias, allowed for critical appraisal for researchers, editorial reviewers, clinicians, and the public at large regarding the quality rating of scientific articles. Obremskey et al reviewed clinical scientific articles published from January to June 2013 in 9 different orthopedic journals and reported that 11.3 % were Level I, 20.7 % were Level II, 9.9 % were Level III, and 58.1 % were Level IV [34] . The scarcity of higher level of evidence literature is further compounded by a variability of quality between the level I evidence articles. In a review of level I evidence from January 2003 to December 2004, Poolman et al demonstrated low Cochrane reporting quality scores among the individual methodological safeguards with further that scores that did not significantly differ between Level I and Level II studies [35] .
The CONSORT statement checklist was established to improve the reporting of randomized control trial design, conduct, analysis, interpretation, and assessment of the validity of results (Table 1) [36] . Recognizing the differences between medical and surgical trials and the limited applicability of CONSORT in surgical trials, a more applicable 10-item CLEAR NPT checklist was developed (Table 2 ) [29] . Chan and Bhandhari evaluated the methodological quality of 87 randomized control trials in 8 orthopedic journals from 2004 to 2008 [37] . The authors demonstrated that 84 % of studies did not clearly report the concealment of the treatment allocation while only 20 % described the experience of the surgeon. Furthermore, blinding was unclear in 55 % of patients, 72 % of ward staff, 74 % of rehabilitation staff, 46 % of clinical outcome assessors, and 38 % of nonclinical outcome assessors. A recent review of the randomized control trials in spine surgery from 2005 to 2010 reported that only 10 % report surgical experience, which is usually a description of the learning curve [38] . Equally as alarming, 77 % of studies were unclear about the concealment of treatment allocation, 68 % were unclear regarding the blinding of participants, 77 % were unclear regarding the blinding of outcome assessors, and 67 % were unclear of adhering to the intention-to-treat principle [38] . The implementation of guidelines such as CONSORT and CLEAR NPT aim to minimize methodological bias and improve the quality of reporting among the randomize control From [28] , with permission trials, especially in the current time of reliance upon comparative effectiveness research. Tangible progress, however, may only be realized with more standardized and strict adherence to the established guidelines. With the strong relationship between the medical device industry and the orthopedic surgery specialty, conflicts of interest are simply unavoidable. Favorable outcomes like those seen in device-sponsored rhBMP-2 trials are not unique. Results are favorable to the implant manufacturer in 73 % of industry-sponsored studies compared with 44 % of independent studies (odds ratio, 3.3; 95 % CI, 2.4-4.5) for spine implants; 93 % and 37 %, respectively, for hip implants; and 75 % and 20 % for knee implants [39] . With the Food and Drug Administration and Public Health Service guidelines suggesting that $5000 to $25,000 of financial relationships with a study sponsor pose a risk of systematic bias, Carragee et al argue that it is impossible to estimate the potential bias from the multimillion-dollar financial industry dealings that involved the original rhBMP-2 trials [40•] .
In an effort to increase transparency and potential bias, required disclosures of industry relationships been implemented by many journals. Yet, there is substantial variability of reported financial disclosure between journals. One industrysponsored study investigating rhBMP-2 use with posterior spinal instrumentation disclosed that "The manuscript submitted does not contain information about medical device(s)/ drug(s). Institutional funds were received in support of this work. No benefits in any form have been or will be received from a commercial party related directly or indirectly to the subject of this manuscript" [12] . Furthermore, the accuracy of industry payment disclosure has significant incongruity. In an evaluation of inconsistencies between physician disclosures and payments reported by industry, authors found that Medtronic and Depuy Spine payments were disclosed by 12.1 % and 8.75 % of physicians attending the 2011 North American Spine Society annual meeting, respectively [41•] . This physician reporting discrepancy is especially concerning, as The Physician Payment Sunshine Act (PPSA) will require the industry to disclose anything of value that has been given to physicians by 2014. It is clear that more standardized practices must be adopted to decrease disclosure discrepancy and increase transparency.
The role for greater transparency may extend to editorial staff of journals in addition to authors and researchers. Journal publication of industry-sponsored studies with inherent systematic alignment for favorable results contributes to a significant source of potential bias in spine literature. In a retrospective review of articles published in the journal Spine from January 2002 to July 2003, the authors reported that industry support was noted for 15.9 %, foundation support for 12.7 %, government support for 10.2 %, and institution support for 3.2 % [42] . The odds ratio regarding the association between 
Conclusions
The original 13 rhBMP-2 industry-sponsored trials significantly under-reported adverse events and complications associated with rhBMP-2 use in spinal fusion surgery, thereby contributing to widespread promotion of on-and off-label use. The subsequent literature review, however, found serious complications ranging from 20 % to 70 % in all settings, which were 10-50 times the original estimates from the industry-associated trials [17••]. The YODA Project, commissioned to report on the safety and efficacy of rhBMP-2, concluded that "rhBMP-2 has no proven clinical advantage over bone graft and may be associated with important harms, making it difficult to identify clear indications for rhBMP-2.
Earlier disclosure of all relevant data would have better informed clinicians and the public than the initial published trial reports did" [20••] . A significant degree of systematic bias undoubtedly contributed to the alignment of favorable outcomes reported in earlier industry-sponsored rhBMP-2 trials, while later independent investigations of the same data from FDA randomized control trials led to differing conclusions. In an effort to better assess the extent of the present and potential bias in the scientific literature, standardized classification and reporting of study design, methodology, data analysis and reporting, and financial conflicts of interests must be advocated. This responsibility must be shared between the scientific community including researchers, surgeons, authors, editors, and reviewers to ensure sufficient integrity of the published literature, which guides clinical decision-making and patient treatment. 
